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LIST OF PARTIES BELOW 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1), the following is a complete list of all parties to the 
proceeding in the district court below: 
Don H. Haycock Plaintiff/Appellant 
Bonnie L. Kaufman, individually Defendant/Appellee 
Bonnie L. Kaufman, as the personal representative of Defendant/Appellee 
the Estate of Ellen S. Haycock in Probate No. 993900051 
pending in Third District Court for Salt Lake County 
Ellen S. Haycock* Defendant 
(Ellen S. Haycock died on January 4, 1999). 
*A Statement of Death of Ellen S. Haycock was filed with the trial court and served on plaintiff 
Don Haycock on January 7, 1999 pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a). Bonnie L. Kaufman as the 
personal representative of the Estate of Ellen S. Haycock in Probate No. 993900051 pending in 
the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah was substituted as a party pursuant 
in the litigation below pursuant to a Stipulation to Substitute Party dated March 30, 1999. R. 
142-148. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
31a-19(3) and 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment in favor of 
appellee Kaufman as a result of plaintiff Don Haycock failing to oppose Kaufman's Motion for 
Summary Judgment within the time allowed under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration? 
2. Was there a contract between Obed and Ellen to make mutual wills and to not 
change their respective testamentary dispositions? 
3. If there was such a contract between Obed and Ellen, was the contract 
unenforceable pursuant of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-701 (1993), amended and re-enacted as 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-514 (Supp. 1999). 
Standard of Review 
The appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, and accords no deference to its conclusions of law. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 
Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 337 (Utah 1997). In reviewing factual issues, the appellate court views 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties. Id. 
192032 1 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes: Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-701 (1993)(emphasis added), amended and re-enacted 
as Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-514 (Supp. 1999): 
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or 
devise, or to die intestate, if executed after the effective date of 
this part, can be established only by a provision of a will stating 
the material provisions of the contract; an express reference in a 
will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the 
contract; or a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the 
contract. The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not 
create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills. 
Court Rules: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e): 
. . . When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 (1)(B): 
Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall 
file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all 
supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after 
service of the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in 
paragraph (1)(D) of this rule. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In early 1983, plaintiff Don H. Haycock ("Don"), the son of Obed C. Haycock 
("Obed") and the stepson of Obed's wife Ellen Haycock ("Ellen"), drafted proposed estate 
192032 1 
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planning documents for Obed and Ellen. Don, who is an attorney licensed in the state of 
California, included in those proposed documents a memorandum that would have 
contractually obligated Obed and Ellen to treat each others' children identically in any 
testamentary disposition of their assets. After Don sent them his proposed documents, Obed 
and Ellen decided not to use Don's planning documents, but instead, retained the services of an 
independent Utah attorney, Narrvel E. Hall of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker to draft their new 
estate planning documents. Obed and Ellen specifically discussed with Mr. Hall the concept of 
contractually limiting the rights of the survivor of them to dispose of their own assets as they 
saw fit and they rejected that concept. Obed died December 10, 1983. In 1998, Don brought 
the action below to enforce what he claims was a "covenant" between Obed and Ellen to treat 
each other's children equally in their respective wills which Don asserts was reflected in the 
draft Memorandum that Don himself prepared for them but which Obed and Ellen rejected. 
Course of Proceedings 
In the action below, appellant Don Haycock brought a lawsuit seeking to 
enforce against Ellen Haycock ("Ellen"), her testamentary estate1, and her daughter, defendant 
Bonnie L. Kaufman what the complaint characterized as an oral "covenant" allegedly made by 
Obed and Ellen in early 1983 to bind the testamentary disposition of their respective estates. 
In June 1999, Defendant Kaufman moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including 
that there was no agreement between Obed and Ellen to bind each other's testamentary 
dispositions let alone a signed writing that would satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 
75-2-701 (1993), amended and re-enacted as Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-514 (Supp. 1999). Don 
1
 Don prematurely named Ellen S. Haycock as a defendant when he filed his complaint. Ellen was alive at the 
time. Ellen's personal representative was substituted as a party by stipulation after Ellen's death in January 
192032 1 
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failed to file a timely opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court granted 
Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a final judgment based upon Don 
Haycock's failure to timely oppose the motion. Don Haycock filed a Rule 60 Motion to set 
aside the grant of summary judgment, alleging that his failure to timely file an opposition to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment was based upon excusable neglect. The trial court denied 
Don's Rule 60 Motion. Don appealed the order granting summary judgment to Defendant 
Kaufman. Don did not appeal the order denying his Rule 60 Motion. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Ellen Haycock ("Ellen") and Obed Haycock ("Obed") were married from 1964 
through the time of Obed's death on December 10, 1983. R. 2-3. 
2. Ellen Haycock died on January 4, 1999. Bonnie L. Kaufman as the personal 
representative of the estate of Ellen S. Haycock was substituted as a defendant in this action in 
place of Ellen S. Haycock. R. 142-148. 
3. Plaintiff Don Haycock ("Plaintiff" or "Don") is the son of Obed Haycock. R. 5. 
4. In approximately February 1983, Don mailed Obed and Ellen wills and other estate 
planning documents that Don, himself, had drafted. Don requested that Obed and Ellen sign 
the documents he had prepared. R. 84-85. 
5. One of the estate planning documents proposed by Don was a Memorandum of 
Change in Testamentary Plan ("Memorandum"). The proposed Memorandum drafted by Don 
contained language that would have contractually bound Obed and Ellen's testamentary 
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6. In February or March 1983, attorney Hal Swenson provided Ellen and Obed with 
an independent analysis of the estate planning documents proposed by Don. R. 85. 
7. Following Hal Swenson's review of Don's proposed estate planning documents, 
Ellen and Obed retained attorney Narrvel Hall of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker to advise them in 
estate planning. R. 188-191. 
8. On April 5, 1983, Ellen and Obed executed new estate planning documents that 
were drafted by Narrvel Hall. R. 188-191. 
9. In connection with the April 1983 estate planning documents, Obed and Ellen 
discussed with Mr. Hall, and specifically rejected, the concept of contractually binding the 
survivor of them to not change the testamentary distribution of his or her own assets in the 
future. R. 187-192, 195-197, 223-225. 
10. Ellen Haycock did not execute any writing in which she agreed that she would not 
change her estate planning documents concerning the treatment of Obed's children, nor did she 
execute any writing that would otherwise limit her ability to dispose of her own assets as she 
wished. R. 223-225. 
11. Obed Haycock's will named defendant Bonnie Kaufman as a possible successor co-
personal representative. Last Will and Testament of Obed C. Haycock dated April 5, 1983. 
R. 193-194, 213. 
12. The trust created by Obed in April 1983 provided that Bonnie Kaufman could serve 
as a successor co-trustee in the event that both Ralph Haycock should die or resign and a 
corporate co-trustee should cease acting as trustee. R. 208. 
192032 1 
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13. Ralph Haycock, a son of Obed Haycock and brother of appellant Don Haycock, has 
been the court-appointed personal representative of the Estate of Obed C. Haycock since Obed 
Haycock's death in 1983. R. 227. 
14. Bonnie Kaufman has never been appointed nor accepted appointment as the 
personal representative of the Estate of Obed C. Haycock or as trustee of any trust created by 
Obed Haycock. R. 160. 
15. Bonnie Kaufman did not accept appointment as either trustee or successor trustee, 
nor did she act as a trustee or successor trustee under any trust executed by Ellen S. Haycock 
until the death of Ellen S. Haycock on January 4, 1999. Upon Ellen's death, Bonnie Kaufman 
accepted appointment as and commenced acting as successor trustee under the declaration of 
trust of Ellen S. Haycock dated March 12, 1985. R. 160. 
16. Bonnie Kaufman was not appointed as and did not accept appointment as personal 
representative of the estate of Ellen S. Haycock until January 11, 1999. R. 160. 
17. Kaufman filed and served a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 17, 1999. R. 
156-158. 
18. Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment was accompanied by a memorandum 
containing a statement of facts supported by references to affidavits, depositions, and other 
portions of the record. R. 159-232 
19. When Don had not filed a response or contacted Kaufman's counsel three weeks 
after the filing of Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment, Kaufman filed and served a 
Notice to Submit for Decision on July 8, 1999. R. 233-235. 
192032 1 
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20. Don filed a memorandum opposing Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
July 14, 1999. Don's opposition was part of a pleading that also contained Don's own cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 238-249. 
21. The Court issued a Minute Entry on August 6, 1999 granting Kaufman's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that Don had failed to timely file any opposition to the 
motion. R. 312-314. 
22. On August 13, 1999, Don filed a Motion Under Rule 60 to Set Aside Minute Entry 
of August 6, 1999 Granting Summary Judgment to Defendants ("Rule 60 Motion"). R. 349-
353. 
23. On September 1, 1999, the trial court entered a Final Judgment granting Kaufman's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 374-379. 
24. The trial court entered an order denying Don's Rule 60 Motion on November 12, 
1999. R. 516-520. 
25. Don did not appeal the order denying Plaintiff's Rule 60 Motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The stated basis for the trial court's ruling was Don's failure to timely file any 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. In his Appellant's Brief, Don fails to even 
address the issue upon which the court based its ruling. The ruling granting summary 
judgment based upon the lack of any timely response was consistent with the applicable rules 
and should be sustained. The trial court's ruling is also sustainable because Defendant 
Kaufman was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law based upon the undisputed 
facts. By the time that Obed and Ellen executed their estate planning documents in April 1983, 
they had rejected Don's planning documents and had unequivocally expressed that they did not 
7 
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wish to bind each other's right to make changes in the future. The agreement alleged by Don 
also fails to satisfy the Utah Uniform Probate Code provision dealing with contracts concerning 
wills. Don's other claims fail because they are dependent upon the existence of a contract 
between Obed and Ellen, and because there was no fiduciary relationship between Bonnie 
Kaufman and Don. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON DON HAYCOCK'S 
FAILURE TO FILE ANY OPPOSITION WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWED 
BY RULE 4-501(l)(B) 
The trial court granted summary judgment because of the failure of Don to file any 
opposition to the motion for two full weeks after expiration of the time allowed by Rule 4-
501(1)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. That rule requires any party opposing 
a Motion for Summary Judgment to file a memorandum in opposition within ten (10) days of 
being served with the motion. The scope of the review on appeal should therefore be limited to 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon the lack of any timely opposition. The Appellant's Brief filed by Don does not 
contains no argument whatsoever concerning the real issue on appeal, which is whether Judge 
Peuler abused her discretion in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Kaufman in 
light of Don's failure to timely file any response to the motion. 
Defendant Kaufman served Don with her Motion for Summary Judgment by mail on 
June 17, 1999. R. 158. Kaufman's motion was properly supported by affidavits, depositions, 
and other references to facts in the record. R. 159-232. Any opposition to the motion by Don 
was due June 30, 1999 under Rule 4-501(l)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
8 
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and Utah R.Civ.P. 6(a). When Don had not responded by July 8, 1999, Defendant Kaufman's 
counsel filed a Notice to Submit for Decision pursuant to Rule 4-501 (1)(B) & (D). On July 14, 
1999, fully two weeks after the deadline, Don finally filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Defendant Kaufman's motion as part of Don's own motion for summary judgment. R. 238. 
Don did not object to the Notice to Submit for Decision or seek any extension of time in which 
to file a memorandum opposing Defendant Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
August 6, 1999, the Court issued a Minute Entry granting Defendant Kaufman's motion on the 
grounds that no timely response had been filed. R. 312-314. Don filed a Rule 60 Motion 
asking the trial court to reconsider its ruling and the untimely papers that Don filed opposing 
Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court denied Don's Rule 60 Motion, and 
Don has not appealed that denial. 
Utah courts consistently ignore late-filed memoranda and grant summary judgment 
when a motion is unopposed or opposed late. See e.g. Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah 1999) ("[t]he court granted [the motion for summary judgment] on August 18 because 
plaintiff's new counsel 'failed to respond to the Motion within 10 days as required by rule 4-
501(l)(b).'"). Rule 56(e) allows a court to grant a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment if no opposition is timely filed, which is precisely what the trial court did. Judge 
Peuler granted the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to a Notice to Submit based upon 
the lack of any timely opposition. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
summary judgment based upon the lack of a response within the time allowed by Rule 4-
501(1)(B). See Farina v. Mission Investment Trust, 615 F.2d 1068, 1076 (5th Cir. 1980) (not 
abuse of discretion to refuse to consider untimely affidavits opposing summary judgment). 
This court should affirm the order and judgment of the trial court. 
9 
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II. APPELLANT'S BRIEF IMPROPERLY RELIES ON AND 
MISCHARACTERIZES NUMEROUS MATTERS OUTSIDE THE 
RECORD 
The Statement of Facts in the Appellant's Brief violates the fundamental principle of 
appellate law that a decision of a lower court is reviewed based upon the record that was 
before the court at the time of its decision. Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam); In re Estate ofCluff, 587 P.2d 128, 129 n.l (Utah 1978). The "facts" 
asserted in Appellant's Brief are replete both with numerous misstatements and also with 
matters that were not before the trial court. The majority of the subparagraphs in Don's 
Statement of Facts cite to matters outside the record.2 Don repeatedly refers to a November 
1999 deposition of Bonnie Kaufman that was conducted in a related lawsuit also brought by 
Don Haycock, even though the deposition did not occur until months after the order Don is 
appealing in this case. That deposition was obviously not before Judge Peuler when she 
granted Defendant Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment. Don also relies upon a 
deposition of Narrvel Hall conducted August 9, 1999 in the other proceeding that could not 
have been before Judge Peuler when she issued her August 6, 1999 minute entry.3 The 
Deposition of Ralph Haycock and the Affidavit of Herbert C. Livsey in related Third District 
Court case no. 980910696PR were also not before Judge Peuler. Many, if not most of the 
citations to matters outside of the record either mischaracterize statements or take statements 
2
 Don's failure to refer to the pages of the original district court record as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(e) 
makes it difficult to discern at a glance which matters were part of the record before the court below and which 
were not. Don lists items that were not part of the record as support for the Appellant's Brief's factual paragraphs 
8.1.2, 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.3, 8.2.4, 8.2.5, 8.4.1, 8.5.5, 8.5.6, 8.5.7, 8.5.8, 8.5.9, 8.5.10, 8.5.11, 8.5.13, 8.5.14, 
8.5.15, 8.6.1, 8.6.2, 8.6.3, 8.7.1 & 8.7.2. 
3An earlier deposition of Narrvel E. Hall was conducted in the case below on December 9, 1998. Portions of that 
earlier December 9, 1998 deposition were part of the record before Judge Peuler when she rendered her decision. 
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out of context. Defendant Kaufman will not refute each of the misleading statements in this 
brief from outside the record as they are immaterial to this court's review of the decision 
below. 
However, Defendant Kaufman feels compelled to advise the court of the most egregious 
citation to a supposed fact outside the record, Don's reference to an April 20, 2000 Third 
District Court ruling granting summary judgment for defendants in another related lawsuit 
brought by Don. Not only was the April 2000 ruling not before Judge Peuler below, Don 
incredibly mischaracterizes it as including a finding of a conspiracy to cover-up between 
Narrvel Hall, Bonnie Kaufman, and Ellen Haycock! That statement is patently false. Don's 
appellate brief states: 
Judge Homer Wilkinson found that Bonnie Kaufman, Ellen Haycock, and 
Attorney Narrvel Hall had conspired and "covered-up" from the plaintiffs, 
the children of Obed Haycock, and the personal representative of his estate 
the existence of the tenancy-in-common deed jointly executed by Obed and 
Ellen Haycock, and notarized by a representative at Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker, that would convert their residence from joint tenancy to tenancy-
in-common. (Order of Judge Wilkinson of April 20, 2000 pursuant to a 
summary judgment hearing on Case No. 980 910 696 PR). 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 22-23 (emphasis original). See also id. at 41-42. The 
court in the related case made no such finding. The words "conspired," "conspire," or 
"conspiracy" do not appear anywhere in the April 20, 2000 ruling. The portion of the 
April 20, 2000 ruling discussing the desire of Ellen Haycock that the deed "not be 
brought to light" does not even mention Narrvel Hall or Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 
much less make a finding that Mr. Hall "conspired" with anyone. Moreover, the 
ruling specifically stated that a desire of Ellen Haycock to keep the deed quiet could 
have just as easily been a reflection of the fact that "Ellen Haycock and her husband 
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Obed decided not to record the deed, therefore she didn't want it to be an issue" rather 
than she was trying to hide something. The court also found that Ellen's desire to keep 
the deed quiet was not material given the lack of delivery of the deed. Partial transcript 
of the April 20, 2000 hearing, at 2-3. A copy of a transcript of the portion of the April 
20, 2000 hearing containing the ruling is attached hereto as Appellee's Appendum A. 
The court made no finding of any conspiracy involving Narrvel Hall or anyone else. 
Don Haycock's blatantly false, self-serving misrepresentation that the court in the 
related proceeding made a finding of a conspiracy violates the fundamental standards of 
conduct of attorneys practicing before the courts of the State of Utah.4 
The court should not consider the various unsupported, extraneous, and inaccurate 
factual allegations contained throughout Don's brief. 
III. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As discussed above, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed because its order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Kaufman based upon the lack of a timely 
response was consistent with Rule 56(e) and Rule 4-501. "[A]n appellate court may affirm a 
'judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record,' even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower 
court as the basis of its ruling." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998). 
4
 Don Haycock further misleads this court by listing several alleged ethical violations by attorney Narrvel Hall. 
Appellate Brief at 41-42. Mr. Haycock fails to advise the court that Mr. Haycock filed a bar complaint against 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and Mr. Hall in 1985 regarding the alleged misconduct, that the bar complaint was 
dismissed as being without merit, and that Judge Wilkinson held that any claims relating to the allegations of 
ethical violations were barred by the statute of limitations. This is apparently the basis for Don Haycock's 
assertion (in bold print) earlier in the Appellate Brief that Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and Mr. Hall breached their 
fiduciary duties. Appellate Brief, at 23. 
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Therefore, even if Don Haycock had timely opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
trial court's ruling should still be affirmed because Defendant Kaufman was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law based upon the undisputed material facts. 
A. Obed and Ellen Rejected the Concept of a Contract Binding Their Respective 
Testamentary Dispositions 
The undisputed evidence is that at the time Obed and Ellen finalized their estate 
planning documents prepared by Narrvel Hall in April 1983, neither Obed nor Ellen wished to 
bind the survivor to a particular disposition of assets. Narrvel Hall discussed in detail with 
Obed and Ellen the concept of possibly limiting the ability of the survivor to change the 
disposition of assets. R. 187-192, 195-197. Mr. Hall testified that both Obed and Ellen 
expressed an intent not to bind the survivor to a particular plan of disposition: 
I do recall that at the time that the will and trust were executed, we discussed 
the fact that at least Mr. Haycock had signed something prepared by his son 
Don and that the apparent intent of that, which - which document I had not seen 
at that point so I was simply going by their explanation of it, that the intent of it 
was to bind the survivor to some plan of disposition that theoretically they 
would have both agreed to. And at that time they clearly indicated to me that 
that was not what they wanted to do . . . . 
R. 192. In a February 1984 letter to Ralph Haycock written less than one year after preparing 
Obed's and Ellen's estate planning documents, Mr. Hall stated that Obed and Ellen had 
considered the idea of binding the survivor to a plan of disposition, but that "[t]his idea was 
flatly and vehemently rejected." R.299-3-1, 303-304, 309-311. Mr. Hall accordingly advised 
Obed and Ellen to destroy whatever estate planning documents Don had prepared because 
neither Obed nor Ellen wanted to use Don's testamentary plan. R. 178-179, 192, 196-197. 
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B. Don Haycock's Claims For Breach of an Alleged Contract Are Barred by the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code 
Even if the undisputed evidence did not clearly indicate that Obed and Ellen decided 
against having an agreement to bind the disposition of each other's testamentary estates, the 
trial court's order granting summary judgment should still be affirmed. The alleged contract 
would not satisfy the requirements of the Utah Uniform Probate Code limiting the 
circumstances under which a party may enforce a contract to make a will or devise. The statute 
in effect in 1983 provided: 
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or 
devise, or to die intestate, if executed after the effective date of 
this part, can be established only by a provision of a will stating 
the material provisions of the contract; an express reference in a 
will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the 
contract; or a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the 
contract. The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not 
create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-701 (1993)(emphasis added), amended and re-enacted as Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-2-514 (Supp. 1999).5 
This special statute of frauds included in the Uniform Probate Code was intended to 
reduce the likelihood of litigation by persons seeking to enforce purported agreements 
regarding wills or devises: "It is the purpose of this section to tighten the methods by which 
contracts concerning succession may be proved. Oral contracts not to revoke v/ills have given 
rise to much litigation in a number of states . . . ." Official Comment to Uniform Probate 
Code § 2-701 (emphasis added). See also Jackson v. Jackson, 122 Utah 507; 252 P.2d 214 
5
 Don Haycock's claims appear to be based upon rights that allegedly accrued prior to July 1, 1998. Former 
Section 75-2-701 would appear to govern. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1301 (Supp. 1998) (1998 amendments do 
not affect rights that accrued prior to July 1, 1998). In any event, the substantive provisions of the 1998 re-
enactment of the statute are essentially identical to those of former Section 75-2-701. 
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(Utah 1953) (holding that alleged oral contract to leave property equally to each of seven 
children was barred by California statute of frauds pertaining to contract to make will). 
The Uniform Probate Code's statute of frauds concerning an agreement to make a will 
or other testamentary disposition is more rigid than other provisions of the statute of frauds. 
Gonzalez v. Satrustegui, 178 Ariz. 92, 870 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Ariz. App. 1993). The court in 
Gonzalez quoted with approval a treatise discussing the policy behind a very restrictive statute 
of frauds, and the particular need for a written contract: 
Written evidence is more necessary in contracts of this sort than in the classes of 
contracts covered by the ordinary provisions of the statute of frauds. . . . The 
death of the promisor makes it impossible to contradict the testimony to the 
effect that he made such promise; . . . 
870 P.2d at 1196, quoting 1 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills § 10.10, at 464 (3rd ed. 1960). The 
court refused to consider parole evidence in determining whether a husband and wife 
contracted to make testamentary dispositions of their property. Id. See also Somogyi's Estate 
v. Marosites, 389 So.2d 244 (Fla. App. 1980) (granting judgment on the pleadings where 
complaint did not allege written agreement to make will). The New Mexico Court of Appeals 
interpreted New Mexico's identical version of the Uniform Probate Code's statute of frauds as 
requiring that "[a] written document, or documents, must be produced which contain the 
essential terms of the contract." Matter of Estate ofVincionif 102 N.M. 576, 698 P.2d 446, 
452 (N.M. App. 1985). 
Don argues that since Obed may have signed the Memorandum of Change of 
Testamentary Disposition prior to Obed meeting with Mr. Hall, the Memorandum satisfies the 
requirements of the existence of a writing "signed by the decedent" in the Utah Probate Code's 
statute of frauds. Appellant's Brief, at 25 & 34. Don's interpretation of the statute is 
15 
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fundamentally flawed. The reference to "decedent" in the statute is clearly intended to apply to 
the person against whom the agreement to make a will or devise is sought to be enforced, 
whether or not that person is actually deceased at the time of enforcement. In Dickie v. 
Dickie, 95 Or. App. 310, 769 P.2d 225 (1989), the Oregon Court of appeals rejected the 
interpretation of Section 2-710 urged by Don in a case involving Oregon's virtually identical 
version of the Uniform Probate Code: 
The use of the word "decedent" instead of the word "testator," they argue, 
shows that the person to be held to the contract must have died. Even assuming 
that the contract here is merely a contract to make a will and nothing more, we 
disagree. 
769 P.2d at 228. This is consistent with the requirement under the general statute of frauds 
that a contract be signed by the party to be charged. Any other interpretation of the statute 
would effectively gut the policy of statutes of fraud to require writing signed by the party to be 
charged. 
In the instant case, there is no evidence of a written agreement signed by Ellen. The 
only copy of the Memorandum produced by Don is not signed by anyone. Appellant's Brief, 
Appendix at 16. While there is some indication that Obed may have signed a version of the 
Memorandum before Obed retained Narrvel Hall as his estate planning attorney, Don admits 
that Mr. Hall told Obed and Ellen to destroy the Memorandum and other estate planning 
documents that Don had prepared. R. 178-179. The purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code provision drastically limiting the means by which agreements to make wills may be 
established is to prevent contentious after-the-fact litigation such as the claims Don is asserting 
here. Don has failed to come forward with any writing that satisfies the Utah statute of frauds 
for contracts concerning testamentary disposition. Ellen Haycock did not execute any writing 
16 
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evidencing a contract that her will and other estate planning documents would always treat the 
children of Obed equally with Ellen's own child. The testimony and contemporaneous notes 
and correspondence of Narrvel Hall, the attorney who drafted the April 1983 estate planning 
documents for Obed and Ellen, establish that by that point in time, Obed and Ellen did not 
wish to bind the survivor of them to a particular disposition of assets. As a matter of law, the 
contract alleged by Don does not satisfy the requirements of the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
for a contract to make a will or other testamentary devise. 
The cases Don cites from other jurisdictions in support of his argument are for the most 
part older cases that do not involve the Uniform Probate Code's narrow limitation on contracts 
to make a will. Don cites to Estate of Housley, 56 Cal. App. 4th 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal. 
App. 1997) as being a case enforcing an oral promise to make wills "under identical law and 
facts." Appellant's Brief at 35. The Housley court held under California law, equitable 
estoppel could take an oral agreement outside of the Uniform Probate Code's statute of frauds. 
There is no Utah case law adopting such an expansive exception to Utah's Uniform Probate 
Code's statute of frauds. Housley is also distinguishable because in the instant case, the 
uncontroverted evidence is that there was no reliance upon a promise of one party. Obed and 
Ellen jointly discussed with counsel the idea of adopting a contract along the lines Don had 
been pushing, but rejected the concept when preparing their April 1983 wills. The trial court's 
ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Kaufman should be affirmed. 
C. The Undisputed Facts Do Not Support Estoppel 
Don also argues that notwithstanding the Utah Probate Code's statute of frauds, Don 
can enforce what he alleges was a promise by Ellen Haycock through the application of 
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equitable or promissory estoppel. Equitable estoppel does not apply in this case as a matter of 
law. The elements of equitable estoppel in Utah are 
Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: 
(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or 
inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of the 
first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) 
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act. 
Nunley v. Vfestates Casing Services, Inc., 1999 UT 100 134, 989 P.2d 1077, 1088, (Utah 
1999). Don cannot establish the first two elements of equitable estoppel. Although Don 
argues that Ellen promised Obed that she would not alter her testamentary scheme, Narrvel 
Hall unequivocally testified that Obed and Ellen discussed that concept at length and rejected it 
prior to signing their testamentary documents in April 1983. 
Q Okay. In that letter you appear to have discussed some 
discussions that you had with Obed and Ellen Haycock 
concerning the possibility of contractually binding one another to 
make certain dispositions of their respective assets by the 
survivor to their own and the other's children; is that correct? 
A Yes. That was a principal subject. 
R. 300. The February 9, 1984 letter to which Mr. Hall referred to in his testimony stated in 
part: 
We did discuss with Obed and Ellen the possibility of their 
entering into a contractual arrangement, somewhat similar to that 
proposed by Don and discussed in Hal Swenson's letter, by which 
the survivor of them would agree not to revise their mutual plan 
of disposition following the death of the first of them to die. This 
idea was flatly and vehemently rejected by them for several 
reasons: First, they both made it very clear that, while Ellen fully 
intended to treat her daughter, Bonnie, and Obed's children 
equally, her assets were her own and she was not to be under any 
legal disability with respect to their use, management or 
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disposition. Obed stated that he was satisfied with an 
arrangement which protected only the residue of his own assets 
for the children and that he did not want the children to be in a 
position to interfer [sic] in any way with Ellen's use or 
management of those assets which were in her own name. The 
implication clearly was that, if any of Obed's children should 
treat Ellen badly during the period she might survive Obed, she 
would be free to "disinherit" those children with respect to those 
assets which she separately owned and controlled. Second, we 
had the same misgivings expressed by Hal Swenson's letter with 
respect to possible unavailability of the marital deduction if 
contractual limitations were imposed on ostensible marital 
deduction gifts. We felt, therefore, that the QTIP Trust is the 
more appropriate vehicle since it is a means of providing such 
limitations which has been specifically authorized by law under 
the circumstances. 
R. 310. (emphasis added). 
The uncontroverted evidence is that Obed Haycock did not rely upon any promise or 
conduct by Ellen that she would be limited in her future ability to change her testamentary 
disposition of her own assets. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that when Obed and 
Ellen discussed the matter with Narrvel Hall, they specifically rejected such a notion. Ellen 
Haycock's response to Request for Admission No. 21 cited by Don (Appellant's Brief at 15-16 
(1 8.1.6) & 36) does not support Don's assertion that Ellen engaged in conduct that would 
have led people to believe that she would be bound not to change her plan of disposition. 
Ellen's response indicates only that her 1983 estate planning documents were consistent with 
her intended plan of testamentary disposition at the time that she signed them. R. 276. It does 
not, as Don implies, indicate that Ellen had obligated herself to never change her will. Don's 
claims for equitable estoppel fail as a matter of law. 
Don's claims also fail under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Under Utah law, if a 
promise is within the statute of frauds, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to 
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enforce the promise unless there has been an explicit and clear promise not to rely on the 
statute of frauds. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 361 (Utah App. 1997); 
Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570, 578 (Utah 1953); McKinnon v. Corporation of the President, 
529 P.2d 434, 436-437 (Utah 1974). Promissory estoppel will bar the defense of the statute of 
frauds only when "'the acts and conduct of the promisor . . . so clearly indicate that he does 
not intend to avail himself of the statute that to permit him to do so would be to work a fraud 
upon the other party.'" Easton v. Wycojf, 295 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1956) (citations omitted). 
Don has not alleged, much less presented evidence of, any promise by Ellen Haycock not to 
invoke the statute of frauds. Accordingly, Don's attempt to use promissory estoppel to 
circumvent the Utah Probate Code's statute of frauds fails as a matter of law. In addition, a 
party cannot utilize promissory estoppel or part performance to enforce a contract if there was 
no contract in the first instance. Anderson v. KFBB Broadcasting Corp., 143 Mont. 423, 391 
P.2d 2, 6 (Mont. 1964). 
It is unclear whether Don may also be attempting to argue that alleged part performance 
by Obed Haycock signing his April 1983 estate planning documents takes the purported 
agreement outside of the Utah Probate Code's statute of frauds. As discussed above, the 
undisputed evidence is that there was no agreement. Even if there had been an oral agreement, 
Don would not be entitled to enforce it under the doctrine of part performance. Utah case law 
provides that part performance must be exclusively referable to the alleged contract for it to 
take an agreement out of the statute of frauds. "Part performance to be sufficient to take a 
case out of the statute must consist of clear, definite, and unequivocal acts of the party relying 
thereon, strictly referable to the contract . . . ." Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983). 
The requirement for exclusively referable reliance "is included to prevent unfounded and 
20 
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fraudulent claims against a decedent's estate, which are inherent within such situations as this." 
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956). The facts 
alleged by Don do not indicate exclusively referable reliance upon an alleged oral agreement. 
Narrvel Hall discussed with Obed and Ellen the possibility of entering into a contract to bind 
each other's testamentary disposition. Narrvel Hall drafted the 1983 testamentary documents 
for both Obed and Ellen with the understanding that there was no such contract and that Obed 
and Ellen had rejected all of the estate planning documents that Don had proposed for them. 
The provisions in Obed's will and trust, which Don alleges indicate reliance upon an alleged 
agreement, are, to the contrary, entirely consistent with Mr. Hall's testimony that Obed and 
Ellen wished to preserve flexibility for the survivor of them. 
The actions of Obed some seventeen years ago were consistent with his expressed 
intent to allow Ellen Haycock the freedom to dispose of her own assets as she wished if she 
should survive him. Obed placed his own assets in a qualified terminable interest property 
("QTIP") marital trust (R. 310), which assets are still being held by Ralph Haycock as trustee 
today and are the subject of one of Don's pending lawsuits in Third District Court. R. 227-
232. There is no evidence of conduct of Obed Haycock that could be exclusively referable to 
part performance of an alleged agreement. The court should affirm the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment as a matter of law. 
D. Don Haycock's Fraud Claim Fails as a Matter of Law 
The Second Cause of Action in Don's complaint alleges that Ellen Haycock committed 
fraud by repeatedly assuring Obed that she had covenanted to treat Obed's children in her will 
the same as she would treat her daughter Bonnie Kaufman. Don's claim for fraud against Ellen 
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is founded upon an alleged understanding and misrepresentation that Ellen had bound herself to 
not change the disposition of her own assets in any future will: 
When [Ellen] repeatedly assured [Obed] that she had made a covenant 
with him and his children, which included a binding legal and moral 
obligation that she would treat his children equally with BONNIE in the 
distribution of the estate he left her, and the home they had purchased 
together. 
R. 8-9. As discussed above, Obed and Ellen made it clear when preparing their April 1983 
wills and other estate planning documents that they did not want any restrictions on the ability 
of the survivor of them to change to whom their own assets would pass if that survivor should 
decide to do so. R. 190-192, 195-196. Kaufman was entitled to summary judgment as to Don's 
Second Cause of Action fails because the fraud claim fails as a matter of law on the undisputed 
facts. 
Don attempts to retroactively create an issue of fact regarding his fraud claim by 
selectively citing and characterizing numerous matters that were not before the trial court, by 
blatantly misrepresenting a recent ruling granting summary judgment against Don in another 
Third District Court lawsuit that was not before Judge Peuler in this case, and by shifting his 
argument to a claim for fraud that was not asserted in his complaint. See Appellant's Brief at 
39-42. Don relies on excerpts of the November 29, 1999 deposition of Bonnie Kaufman taken 
in another of Don's lawsuits against Kaufman and Ellen's estate, and upon Don's 
mischaracterization of portions of the deposition taken out of context. Bonnie Kaufman's 
deposition occurred months after entry of the order Don is appealing. Don's attempt to spin 
selected excerpts of material outside of the record in such a way as infer fraud is improper and 
should not be considered in this appeal. 
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The fraud alleged in Appellant's Brief also differs significantly from the fraud alleged 
in Don's complaint. The complaint alleged that Ellen failed to disclose that she did not intend 
to honor the alleged "covenant" to not change her estate planning documents. R. 8-10. On 
appeal, Don now asserts that the fraudulent conduct was that Ellen told Obed that Don's estate 
planning documents were worthless, and that Ellen and Bonnie fraudulently induced Obed to 
change his mind about having a contract to bind his and Ellen's testamentary disposition. 
Appellant's brief at 40-41. 
Even if the undisputed evidence did not establish that Obed and Ellen mutually decided 
that they would not restrict the ability of the survivor of them to change to whom the 
survivor's own assets could pass, Don's fraud claim would be barred. Don cannot use a claim 
for fraud to nullify the effect of the Utah Uniform Probate Code's statute of frauds on the 
alleged agreement upon which Don is basing his claims: 
Nor, as a general rule, can fraud be predicated upon the failure to perform a 
promise or contract which is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, since in 
such case the promisor has not, in a legal sense, made a contract, and hence has 
the right, both in law and in equity, to refuse to perform. 
It would be an easy way to completely nullify the statute of frauds by claiming 
that an oral contract made void because not in writing, was made good by the 
fraudulent intent of the maker . . . . 
Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 P. 856, 862 (1929) (citations omitted). Where the 
real basis for a fraud claim is an alleged contract that is unenforceable under the statute of 
frauds, a plaintiff cannot use a fraud claim to circumvent the statute. Id. Defendant Kaufman 
was entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action. 
Although labeled as a fraud claim, the Second Cause of Action in Don's complaint is 
clearly based upon an alleged agreement between Obed and Ellen. If there was such an 
192032 1 
23 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
agreement, it is not enforceable under the Utah Uniform Probate Code's statute of frauds. 
Don cannot nullify the probate code's statute of frauds by recharacterizing his claim. The trial 
court properly granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action. 
E. The Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Fail as a Matter of Law 
The Third Cause of Action in Don's complaint asserted that Don was entitled to recover 
from defendant Bonnie Kaufman on a theory of breach of fiduciary duty for conduct in 1984, 
1985 and 1994 in which allegedly she encouraged Ellen to breach her supposed oral covenant 
with Obed. R. 10-12. Don's complaint based the breach of fiduciary duty claim upon four 
alleged relationships of Bonnie to wills or trusts of Obed or Ellen: 
(1) Bonnie allegedly having accepted appointment as a successor executor of the 
Estate of Obed C. Haycock; 
(2) Bonnie having allegedly accepted appointment as a successor trustee of a 
trust established by Obed; 
(3) Bonnie having allegedly accepted appointment as executor of the Estate of 
Ellen Haycock; and 
(4) Bonnie having allegedly accepted appointment as trustee of a trust 
established by Ellen. 
R. 10-12. The undisputed facts established that Bonnie Kaufman had no fiduciary duty to Don 
at the time of the alleged breach of that duty. 
It is axiomatic that for a personal representative or trustee to have a fiduciary duty, the 
personal representative must actually assume the responsibility for the estate or trust and be 
acting as the person in charge of such. E.g., Callister v. Callister, 15 Utah 2d 380, 393 P.2d 
477, 480 n.3 (Utah 1964) ("Once appointed and acting, the representative becomes as to the 
24 
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heirs and devisees, a fiduciary . . . . " ) (emphasis added, citation omitted). A trustee is a 
fiduciary because he or she has "exclusive control of the trust property . . . ." Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates, 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981). 
1) Bonnie Kaufman Has Never Acted As Executor of Obed Haycock's 
Estate or As Trustee of A Trust Created by Obed Haycock. 
Bonnie Kaufman has never served as personal representative of the Estate of Obed C. 
Haycock, or as trustee of any trust formed by Obed Haycock. R. 160. Ralph Haycock was 
duly appointed as personal representative of Obed's estate by the Third District Court in 1984. 
R. 227. Ralph Haycock is also the trustee under Obed Haycock's testamentary trust. In fact, 
Don Haycock is suing his brother Ralph Haycock in yet another lawsuit for alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty by Ralph as personal representative and trustee of Obed's probate estate and 
testamentary trust. R. 227. 
Naming a person as a potential successor trustee or successor personal representative 
does not by itself impose upon them any duty or liability. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-103 
(must be appointed by court " to acquire the powers and undertake the duties and liabilities of 
a personal representative"); Utah Code Ann. § 22-1-1 (fiduciary includes "trustee . . . or any 
other person acting in a fiduciary capacity" (emphasis added)). Bonnie Kaufman has never 
been appointed as personal representative of Obed's estate. She has never acted as trustee or 
as a personal representative in connection with Obed's estate or trust. Bonnie has not 
exercised any control over property of Obed's estate or trust. R. 160. There has been no 
fiduciary duty between Bonnie and Don in connection with Obed's estate or trust. 
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2) There Was No Probate Estate of Ellen Havcock at the Time of the 
Alleged Conduct that Could Have Given Rise to a Fiduciary Duty, 
Don's complaint alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by Kaufman for conduct in 1984, 
1985 and 1994. R. 10-12. The conduct upon which Don bases his claim occurred prior to 
Ellen's death and therefore prior to Bonnie Kaufman being appointed as personal representative 
of Ellen's estate. There was no probate estate of Ellen Haycock until her death in January 
1999. Bonnie Kaufman was not appointed as the personal representative of the Estate of Ellen 
Haycock until January of 1999. Moreover, Don admits that he is not an heir or devisee of 
Ellen Haycock. R. 7, 9-10. Don's claims against Bonnie Kaufman for breach of fiduciary 
duty as personal representative of the estate of Ellen Haycock fail as a matter of law. 
3) Bonnie Kaufman Never Served as Trustee of Any Trust for Which Don 
Haycock Was A Beneficiary. 
For the same reasons that any breach of fiduciary duty claims based upon Bonnie 
Kaufman being the personal representative of the probate estate of Ellen Haycock fail, Don's 
claims based upon alleged breach of fiduciary duty of Bonnie as trustee of a trust also fail as a 
matter of law. Bonnie Kaufman did not become a trustee under Ellen Haycock's trust until 
January 1999, years after the conduct that Don alleges was a breach of a fiduciary duty. R. 
160. Don admits that he was not an heir or beneficiary of any trust or will under which 
Bonnie Kaufman served as trustee or personal representative. R. 7 (paragraph 19 of the 
Complaint alleges that Ellen S. Haycock disinherited "all of Obed's children," including Don, 
on March 12, 1985 when she revoked her prior trust and will and executed new estate planning 
documents). Don ceased being an heir of Ellen or beneficiary under a trust of Ellen years 
prior to the time that Bonnie Kaufman became personal representative of Ellen's estate or 
trustee of Ellen's trust. 
26 
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F. There Is No Basis upon which to Impose a Constructive Trust 
Don argues that Bonnie Kaufman became a "constructive trustee and fiduciary of the 
Obed Haycock Estate that she received." Appellant's Brief, at 38.6 The argument that there 
was a constructive trust as to Obed Haycock's probate estate fails as a matter of law. Utah law 
will not impose a constructive trust simply to placate a person disappointed under a will. Utah 
law generally requires the existence of a "confidential relationship" between the parties and a 
breach of an oral or implicit relationship. Mattes v. Olearain, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 759 
P.2d 1177 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). See also Nielson v. 
Rasmussen, 2 Utah, 558 P.2d 511, 513 (1976). Although the Utah Supreme Court in Parks v. 
Zion First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983) recognized that other situations may 
warrant a constructive trust under exceptional circumstances, such as where one spouse 
completely dominates the financial affairs of a marriage and took advantage of pooled funds, 
no such circumstances are present or even alleged between Obed and Ellen Haycock. 
Moreover, the undisputed evidence is that Narrvel Hall advised both Obed and Ellen 
concerning their testamentary plans and that both Obed and Ellen knowingly decided not to 
bind the survivor to any particular disposition. The Parks decision made clear that 
disappointment of a relative under a will is not a basis for imposing a constructive trust. Id. at 
600, quoting Adams v. Jankouskas, 452 A.2d 148, 153 (Del. Supr. 1982) ("It is important to 
note that this is not a case where a party was disappointed with what he received under a 
will."). 
6
 The prayer for relief in the complaint asked for imposition of "[a] constructive trust on all third persons that 
have received money and other properties from the estate OBED left ELLEN." R. 14. The complaint did not 
contain a separate cause of action seeking imposition of a constructive trust. R. 1-14. 
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G. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on the Claims Alleging 
Inducement of Breach of Contract 
Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action alleged that defendant Bonnie Kaufman induced 
Ellen to breach the alleged oral agreement with Obed regarding testamentary disposition. R. 
12-13. A valid contract is a prerequisite to any claim for inducement of breach of contract. 
Don's claims for inducement for breach of contract fail because there was no contract between 
Ellen and Obed binding their testamentary disposition of assets. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD DEFENDANT KAUFMAN HER ATTORNEY'S 
FEES INCURRED AS A RESULT DON'S MISREPRESENTATIONS AND 
IMPROPER CITATION TO MATTERS OUTSIDE THE RECORD 
The numerous references by Don Haycock in his brief to factual matters outside the 
record in this case include a serious misrepresentation of a recent ruling by a Third District 
Court judge in a related case. Bonnie Kaufman has been required to incur costs and attorney's 
fees to respond to this misrepresentation. Don Haycock is appearing before this court both as a 
pro se litigant and as an attorney pro hac vice. He is subject to all of the provisions governing 
conduct of attorneys admitted to appear before the court. Utah R. App. P. 40(d). Don 
Haycock's conduct of blatantly misrepresenting the recent ruling of the Third District Court is 
conduct unbecoming a person allowed to practice before this court.7 Kaufman hereby requests 
that the Court award sanctions against Don Haycock under Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure to compensate Kaufman for her attorney's fees incurred in responding to 
Don Haycock has engaged in improper conduct as a litigant in other courts. The United States District Court 
for the Central District of California awarded attorneys' fees against Don Haycock as a party in a false claims act 
case in which Don was both plaintiff and attorney because he "should have stopped litigating after the disclosures 
which showed absence of fraud or false statement." United States ex rel Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27664 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of attorney's fees against 
Don Haycock. Id. 
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the misrepresentation as well as her costs, including the cost of the transcript of the district 
court's ruling in the related case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Don Haycock was clearly disappointed that his father Obed and Obed's wife 
rejected Don's proposed estate planning documents in early 1983 and instead obtained the 
services of independent attorney Narrvel Hall of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. Such 
disappointment does not, however, give rise to actionable claims. Don's pursuit of the action 
below and this appeal are nothing more than an attempt to posthumously impose Don's rejected 
estate planning upon Obed and Ellen more than seventeen years later. Based on the foregoing, 
the Court should affirm the trial court's order and judgment granting summary judgment in 
favor of Kaufman. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this )7 / \ a y of June, 2000. 
Thoma 
Douglas J. Payne 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees Bonnie L. 
Kaufman, individually and as personal 
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The above entitled cause of action 
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Homer F. Wilkinson, a judge of the Third District 
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Thursday, April 20, 2000, 
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1 T h u r s d a y , A p r i l 2 0 , 2 0 0 0 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Let me indicate to you, counsel, 
4 that I have spent considerable time in reading the 
5 memorandums, that are quite voluminous, number of 
6 motions, much of which is repetitive, I have gone 
7 over and looked at the exhibits and motions, along 
8 with the material in which you cited here today, 
9 I have had an opportunity to read and go over and 
10 to look at it, I've read your memorandums, 
11 It is not new to me as far as your arguments are 
12 concerned, 
13 Now first of all, I want it understood that 
14 all, and I think both counsel addressed this, are 
15 procedural motions such as the Summary Judgment 
16 not being properly filed; the improper service upon 
17 Ray, Quinney and Mr, Hall, and also the 
18 reconsideration of 56(F) motion, all of those 
19 procedural matters the Court is denying those. And I 
20 am getting right down to the substantive matter and I 
21 want to cover all motions as far as it is concerned 
22 today, 
23 The Court is of the opinion and it does 
24 find that there was a Quit Claim Deed which was 
25 prepared, transferred the property from all tenancy 
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1 in common to joint tenancy, with the grantors and 
2 the grantees being the same, meaning Mr. Haycock and 
3 his wife. They were named (inaudible). That this 
4 deed was delivered to the Haycocks. Whether to Obed 
5 or Ellen Haycock, it is not clear. I don't think 
6 anybody knows. I don't think it is material. That 
7 the deed has not been able to be discovered or 
8 found, although a copy of the deed, of course, was 
9 in the file of Mr. Hall and Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. 
10 That the deed did not leave the possession 
11 of the Haycocks as far as being recorded or as 
12 delivery to any other individual for recording. In 
13 fact, the evidence is that Mr. Hall or 
14 Mr. (inaudible), I don't know which one. You know 
15 better than I do, delivered the deed to the Haycocks 
16 for them to record which apparently they chose not 
17 to do. 
18 That evidence does show by the letters 
19 referred to by Mr. Haycock to his son Don and to 
20 notes to his attorney that even though it would be a 
21 tax advantage for them to change, he did not wish to 
2 2 change. 
23 And yes, I think there is evidence also 
24 that the wife, Ellen Haycock, through her daughter, 
25 the Defendant Kaufman, that the deed was to be 
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covered over and not brought to light. And you can 
take that both ways. You can take it she is trying 
to hide something. You could also take it that 
Ellen Haycock and her husband Obed decided not to 
record the deed, therefore she didn't want it to be 
an issue. I don't think that is material. 
The Court has ruled as a matter of law that 
the deed never left the possession of the grantor 
and that it was not a valid delivery of the deed. 
And that the Quit Claim Deed itself would be null 
and void as such. 
The Court also finds that Amended Fourth 
Amended Complaint as filed by the plaintiffs, cites 
three causes of action: Conversion, breach of the 
judiciary, and fraud and deceit. 
The Court is of the opinion that each one 
of those causes of action are barred by the Statute 
of Limitations of the State of Utah. 
The Court would grant summary judgment. 
The bulk of summary judgment is filed by the 
Defendant Kaufman. 
Also, there are amended motions to Summary 
Judgment. I am not sure why the Amended Motion is 
filed, but anyway it was. 
I will also grant the Defendant Hall and 
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4 
R&y# Quinney & Nebeker's motion to dismiss filed on 
November 4th, and would deny the plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment recently filed. That was the 
-- I donft know that I need to refer to that date. 
Now there are also some other motions that 
I think become moot as a result of the Court's 
ruling in this fashion. 
The Court would grant the motion of 
Defendant Kaufman or the order authorizing the 
release of the proceeds and the sale of the real 
property with this provision or modification: that 
it not be effective for a period of 30 days from the 
date that this Order is signed, or until, if the 
plaintiffs see fit to appeal this matter, that the 
necessary bonds are filed with the Court as far as 
this is concerned. 
Counsel, I think that covers it all. Are 
there other motions that have not been covered. 
Please make it known cause I want everything to be 
disposed at this date. Any comments or questions? 
VOICE: (Mr. Payne): Your Honor, I think 
that that covers it from our perspective. I just 
want to make it clear that the Statute of 
Limitations ruling applies to all of the claims in 
the estate against all defendants, including 
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Defendant Kaufman? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
VOICE: (Mr. Payne): And for clarification 
purposes, the reason for an amended motion for a 
summary judgment was we filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment October 12th, and on October 13th the 
plaintiffs served their Fourth Amended Complaint. 
So the amended motion was filed the next day on the 
Fourth Amended Complaint. 
THE COURT: I think there was a motion in 
there for something to do with the dismissal of the 
Fourth Amended Complaint, but that is also disposed 
of. 
VOICE: (Mr. Christensen): Just for 
clarification, the Court granted our Motion to 
Dismiss, and though my comment may be somewhat 
duplicative, but we joined in the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and may the ruling reflect the span with 
respect to us as well? 
THE COURT: And that would be the ruling, 
for sure. 
VOICE: (Mr. Christensen): Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Haycock, any questions? 
VOICE: (Mr. Haycock) No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Who is going to prepare the 
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6 
pleadings ? 
VOICE: (Mr. Payne) I will prepare them, 
Your Honor* 
THE COURT: Mr. Payne, submit them to 
Mr. Haycock. I appreciate your arguments this 
morning, counsel, thank you. 
VOICE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon court adjourned) 
* * * * * * 
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